On 26 June 1988, an Air France Airbus A320 carrying 75 passengers, which was carrying out a demonstration at a small airport in Habsheim, Alsace, crashed into a forest at the end of the runway, killing three people. The Airbus A320 was the first aircraft to be fitted with electric flight controls and designed to be flown by a two-pilot crew. These technical innovations provoked hostility from pilots, who felt they had lost control of the aircraft and went on strike against two-pilot operations. Following an analysis of the black boxes, the conclusions of the BEA (Accident Investigation Bureau, now the Bureau of Investigation and Analysis) cleared the aircraft of any blame. It was a pilot error: the pilot, having failed to spot an 11-metre-high forest at the end of the runway prior to take-off, had descended to 10 metres above the ground and, despite applying go-around, had been unable to avoid the crash. However, the initial analyses had been leaked and, as is always the case at that stage – due to the instruments not yet being calibrated and adjusted – the results were inconsistent.
The Transport Minister, who arrived at the scene immediately, had declared even before the BEA’s investigation that the accident was due to pilot error. The black boxes had been handed over by the Public Prosecutor to the Director-General of Civil Aviation, who had passed them on to the BEA after transporting them in the DGAC (Directorate-General for Civil Aviation) aircraft. The conditions were ripe for controversy: a pilot, supported by the investigating judge, accused the BEA of tampering with the data to pin the blame on the crew in order to save the aeroplane and the ‘Franco-German military-industrial complex’. The BEA, backed by the DGAC, was forced to bring a defamation case, which it won in the district court, the regional court and the Court of Cassation. Having repeated in public the accusations made in court, the pilot’s lawyer was also convicted of defamation.
The DGAC was never held legally liable in connection with this accident. However, the pilot was sentenced to a custodial term by the Colmar Court of Appeal. The organisers of the event were also convicted for staging an air show in flout of all safety regulations. The pilot continued to blame the aircraft right to the end, with the support of the victims. This is a landmark case from a technical, emotional and legal perspective. Not only was it the first time an Airbus had crashed shortly after entering service, but it was also the first time the BEA had appeared in the media and on the judicial stage. And finally, because the authorities, the BEA and the defence were compelled to bring a libel case against the pilot.
This case marked the starting point of often conflictual relations between the administrative authority, the BEA, and the judicial authority, which from then on frequently regarded the BEA as a rival body lacking independence. It has been the subject of criticism from the judicial authority and pilots in all cases, including that of the Concorde. Until, on each occasion, the futility of the judicial expert reports became apparent during the public hearing, demonstrating the absurdity of this rivalry.
Alongside the UK’s AAIB, Germany’s BPU, Russia’s MAK and the US’s NTSB, the BEA is one of the most respected and sought-after air accident investigation bodies whenever an accident occurs anywhere in the world.
For more than 35 years, the legal proceedings – which became routine following every accident against DGAC officials defended by the firm – have almost always resulted in cases being dismissed or acquittals.